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Problems of Policy Implementation in Distributed Decision Systems 
Wise policies, effectively implemented, are essential to the 
successful functioning of any complex organization. We can think of 
policy as being defined at the executive or command level and 
communicated throughout the organizational hierarchy in order to guide 
the decisions that must be taken at all levels. In the business world, 
for example, executive policies may establish the company philosphy 
regarding price, quality, and quantity. In the military world, policy 
may specify the appropriate weight to be given to achievement of some 
strategic objective relative to the risks to life, equipment, and 
political alliances that military action may place in jeopardy. In the 
technological world, policies are often framed within the context of a 
general analytic model such as cost/benefit or decision analysis. 
Quantitative tradeoff functions or utility curves may be derived to 
represent, in precise terms, "executive policy." 
Once policy is established, implementation becomes a major 
concern. Will lower-level staff understand how to implement it? Will 
they want to implement it? Will the executives themselves be 
consistent across situations in their policy views. The answers to 
these questions will undoubtedly depend upon a number of interacting 
factors, including the nature of the general model or policy, the 
specific decision task, the presence of competing goals within the 
organization, and the time interval between the setting of a policy and 
its implementation. 
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Problems in Translating General Policies .!!!!2.. Specific Decisions 
Some general policies may be easily propagated across 
organizational levels. Consider, for example, a large department store 
whose executives desire to position the store at a particular niche 
with regard to price and quality (e.g., a notch below top quality and a 
notch below top price). Because this is a fairly predictable 
environment with repeatable, well-defined decision tasks and a standard 
nomenclature, it should be relatively easy for the buyers in each 
department to put such a policy into practice when they purchase 
wholesale goods for the store's showrooms. 
In other cases, where the criteria for satisfying a policy are 
less well defined and the decision situations are unique and complex, 
implementation may be much more problematic. Policy makers may not 
have an adequate understanding of the variety of specific decisions 
that will be made "in the field," and they may not have anticipated 
what their policies imply in those situations. I suspect that risk 
policies fall into this problem category. 
This suspicion gains support from studies such as one in which my 
colleagues and I asked people to consider the general policy toward 
loss of life that they believed appropriate to guide decision making in 
civil defense emergencies (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1980). 
Policies were framed in terms of disutility or social cost functions 
defined over N, the number of lives that might be lost in a mishap. 
Three specific policies were presented for examination (see Figure 1). 
The instructions provided elaborate rationales in support of each 
function. Curve 1, the linear form, represents the view that every 
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life lost is equally costly to society. Curve 2, the exponentially 
increasing function, represents the view that large losses of life are 
disproportionately serious; for example, that the loss of twenty lives 
is more than twice as bad as the loss of ten lives. Curve 3 represents 
a reduced sensitivity to large losses of life; for example, the loss of 
twenty lives is less than twice as bad as the loss of ten lives. 
Subjects were asked to study each curve and its rationale and then to 
indicate the one that they favored most and least. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
In addition to making .. executive level" evaluations of these 
general policies, the same subjects were asked to consider a specific 
decision problem that might be faced by a local official in a civil 
defense emergency. The problem, shown in Figure 2, posed a choice 
between two options involving the loss of life. While, on average, the 
expected loss of life was the same for both options, they differed 
considerably in the range of possible outcomes. Option A would lead to 
either 5 or 95 lives lost; option B would lead to either 40 or 60 lives 
lost. 
More than half of the subjects preferred Curve 2 in the policy 
setting task and chose option A in the decision task. However, Option 
A indicates a risk-seeking attitude toward loss of life, whereas Curve 
2 represents risk aversion. Choice of Option A would be consistent 
with Curve 3, which was the least favored policy. 
When confronted with the inconsistency in their responses, most 
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subjects refused to change. They claimed to see no connection between 
the two tasks. Most appeared to be relying on some variant of the 
following justification offered for choosing Option A: "It would be 
immoral to allow the loss of forty lives or more when Option A presents 
a good chance of coming out of the situation with almost no loss of 
life." This perspective was evoked by the structure of the choice 
problem but not by the task of evaluating the three general policies 
toward loss of life. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
This study, along with other results not cited here (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982), demonstrates that our policies are 
shaped by contextual factors. In this case, the specific decision 
triggered a rationale for choice that was simply not apparent in the 
evaluation of the general policy functions. 
In the study reported here, the~ people took on the role of 
policy evaluators and policy implementers and, even then, did not 
implement the preferred general policy. In a complex system, where the 
policy setters and field staff are different individuals, in distant 
relationships to one another, it is even CTore likely that general 
policies will be judged inappropriate by decision makers in the field 
or by others who may be called upon later to evaluate those policies in 
the light of hindsight (Fischhoff, 1982). 
One implication of this work for distributed decision-making 
systems is that the process of generating general policies must be 
5 
designed to anticipate the myriad of specific decision contexts in 
which the policy will be applied. One might argue that the various 
rationales that may be elicited by those specific decisions should be 
used to shape the general policy. If these rationales are 
inconsistent, either this inconsistency must be resolved or the general 
policy will have to be modified to make it compatible with a more 
complex perspective. In some cases, no general policy may be 
appropriate to guide all of the specific decisions that will emerge. 
In such cases, automation of decision making on the basis of a pre-
programmed general policy may be unwise. 
Research is needed to provide insight into this aspect of 
distributed decision making. We need to determine the kinds of tasks 
and models that may be most susceptible to this problem and to develop 
ways of constructing, communicating, and implementing policies so as to 
minimize adverse consequences. 
Plans, Time, and Distributed Decision Making 
Decisions in complex systems are not only distributed across and 
between organizational levels. They are also distributed over time. 
Some delay between the time at which a decision is made and the time at 
which it is executed is inevitable, due to the difficulties of 
communicating to all involved parties and mobilizing forces and 
resources for action. 
A second category of delay is likely to be of greater duration and 
significance for policy implementation. This is delay that is 
deliberately introduced in the process of planning. The essence of 
planning is anticipating important future decision problems and 
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prescribing courses of action to take should they actually occur. In 
principle, planning far in advance should allow a more leisurely and 
thoughtful analysis, with better utilization of experts and decision 
aids than would be possible in the "heat of the moment." The success 
of such efforts depends on the planner's ability to imagine in advance 
how various decision situations will appear, should they come about. 
If the actual situations and plans do not resemble their earlier 
images, then the preplanned decisions based on those images may no 
longer seem appropriate. In such cases, the decision maker must decide 
on short notice whether to adhere to the plan, or to come up with a new 
plan on the spot. An obvious danger in developing a new strategy 
occurs when conditions do, in fact, materialize as planned but, for 
various reasons, they are judged to be otherwise; in this case the 
action that seems best may deviate from the original plan. 
What are the pitfalls of making planning decisions in advance? 
Can we trust our plans made in advance to be better than those made on 
the spur of the moment? How are our judgments and decisions likely to 
be influenced by our attempts to imagine and anticipate what the future 
will look like? 
I believe that research in psychology and behavioral decision 
theory can help answer these questions. Yet, to my knowledge, such 
research has rarely been brought to bear on these issues. I shall 
briefly outline the directions such work might take, examining the 
possible effects of temporal distance (and the hypotheticality that is 
often associated with it) on the construction and implementation of 
plans. 
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Some hypotheses. The "best laid plans" may later seem 
inappropriate for several reasons. One such reason is failing to 
anticipate the impact that certain kinds of information will have on 
one's perception or diagnosis of the situation. For example, Fischhoff 
(1978) demonstrated that people will anticipate using certain kinds of 
information to solve an inferential problem, but will actually ignore 
that information when it is received. Apparently, when people consider 
such information in the planning stage, they are able to see its 
relevance. However, its informational implications are ignored when it 
appears in context of other more salient cues. 
Another potential source of difficulty is that the goals, 
utilities, or criteria that underlie our policies may change 
systematically between the time our plans are made and the time they 
must be implemented. There are a number of factors that might induce 
systematic changes: 
(a) Hypotheticality. One possibility is that the hypothetical 
nature of the planning process may systematically alter or distort 
preferences. Support for this hypothesis comes from a study (Slovic, 
1969) in which I found that persons choosing among gambles "as if they 
really were to play them" attempted to maximize gains, whereas persons 
who really did have to play those gambles were more concerned about 
minimizing losses. Recently we have observed that persons 
introspecting about the relative importance of rescuing people in 
trouble vs. preventing such troubles in the first place express the 
belief that both efforts deserve equal resources. In reality, rescue 
typically commands much greater resources than prevention. 
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(b) Intervening gains or losses. Many anecdotal reports and some 
experimental results indicate that changes in one's status (wealth, 
power, strategic advantage, etc.) will change one's preferences among 
courses of action. For example, losses appear to encourage risk taking 
(McGlothlin, 1956), whereas gains appear to make people more 
conservative (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1985). 
(c) Differential approach and avoidance gradients. According to 
the classic approach-avoidance model of conflict (Miller, 1944), the 
strength of avoidance tendencies increases more rapidly with nearness 
(in time or space) to a goal than does the strength of the approach 
tendency. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In planning terms, this 
implies that as we move from planning exercises, remote in time and 
space, toward the "real operation," the perceived risks of a course of 
action may gain in prominence, relative to the perceived benefits. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
This model has important implications for planning efforts. One 
is that the planner's preferences may shift significantly between the 
time plans are made and the time they are put into action, even in the 
absence of new information. For example, what one stands to gain from 
a course of action may weigh more heavily in one's future plans, while 
what one stands to lose may loom larger as the time for action draws 
near. Similar shifts may occur for probabilities as well; the 
probability of loss may seem less salient in the future than in the 
present. Moreover, the strengths of our preferences may vacillate over 
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time. We may feel more sure of our preferences about actions to be 
taken in the distant future than we would about imminent actions. 
These predictions are, of course, dependent upon the adequacy of 
Miller's conflict resolution theory as a model of future planning. At 
first glance the model seems intuitively plausible, and its predictions 
have been confirmed in several small experimental studies (Bjorkman, 
1984; Jones & Johnson, 1973; Wright & Weitz, 1977). However, further 
empirical study is needed to determine to what extent Miller's theory 
applies to planning. Sizeable temporal effects, if found, would have 
profound implications for the planning process. An understanding of 
these effects would be essential for the design of policies that would 
appear as appropriate at the time of decision as when they were first 
formulated. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Three policies regarding the seriousness of multiple-
fatality events. 
Figure 2. An emergency-response decision. 
Figure 3. Differential slopes of approach and avoidance gradients. 
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Figure 1. Three policies regarding the seriousness of multiple-fatality events. 
A committee in a large metropolitan a~ met recently to discuss contingency plans in 
the event o( various emergencies. One emergency threat under consideration posed t'A·o 
options, both involving some Joss oflife. These arc described below. Read them and incfi. 
care your opinion about the relath·e merits of each. 
Option A carries with it a .5 probibility of containing the threat with a J055 of 
5 lives and a .5 probability oflosing 95 lives. It is like taking the gamble: .5 lose . 
5 lives, .5 lose 95 lives. 
Option B carries with it a .5 probability of containing the threat with a loss of 
40 lives and a .5 probability oflosing 60 lives. It is like taking the gamble: .5 lose 
40 lives, .5 lose 60 lives. 
\'\''1ich option would you select? Option A __ Option B __ 
Figure 2. An emergency-response decision. 
Strength of 
Tendency 
' 0 
' ' ', 0 '-----'--------------lit...----' 
0 
Distanc,e from Goal 
Figure 3. Differential slopes of approach and avoidance gradients. 
